Emotional Choices: How the Logic of Affect Shapes Coercive Diplomacy

In coercive diplomacy, states threaten the use of military force to get actors to

change their behavior. It is a strategy that seeks to “persuade” targets to

comply rather than “bludgeon” them into doing so, according to Alexander

George.1 This form of forceful persuasion has long been a popular instrument

in international relations, because it holds the promise of achieving an

opponent’s acquiescence without incurring the cost in blood and treasure of

military intervention. The large majority of coercive threats are issued by

powerful states against considerably weaker targets.2 It would seem intuitive

that a coercer’s military superiority renders coercive diplomacy particularly

effective.3 In the words of the war theorist Carl von Clausewitz, “when one

force is a great deal stronger than the other, an estimate may be enough. There

will be no fighting: the weaker side will yield at once.”

4 The historical record